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A Fair Trial for the Accused
FAIRNESS IN ACCUSATION OF CRIME
AusTix W. ScoTT, JR.*
The following two forms of indictment for murder give some
indication of the progress toward simplification which it is possible
to make.
The State v. Wiley Freeman
The State of South Carolina, Edgefield District
To wit:
At a Court of Sessions, begun to be holden m and for the district of
Edgefield, in the State of South Carolina, at Edgefield court house, m the
district and State aforesaid, on the fourth Monday in March, m the year of
our Lord one thousand eight hundred and tlrty-eight, the jurors of and for
the district of Edgefield aforesaid, m the State of South Carolina aforesaid,
that is to say-
Upon their oaths present, that Wiley Freeman, laborer, on the tenth day
of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven,
with force and arms, at Edgefield court-house, m the district and State
aforesaid, in and upon one Mary Freeman, m the peace of God and this
State then and there being, felomously, wilfully, and of his malice afore-
thought, did make an assault, and that the said Wiley Freeman, with a cer-
tain gun called a rifle gun, of the value of ten dollars, then and there charged
with gun powder and two leaden bullets, which said gun he the said Wiley
Freeman in both Is hands then and there had and held, at and against the
said Mary Freeman, then and there feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice
aforethought, did shoot off and discharge, and that the said Wiley Freeman,
with the leaden bullets aforesaid, by means of shooting off and discharging
the said gun so loaded, to, at, and against the said Mary Freeman, as afore-
said, did then and there felomously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought,
strike, penetrate and wound the said Mary Freeman, in and upon the left side
of the said Mary Freeman, below the left breast of her the said Mary Free-
man, giving to her the said Mary Freeman, then and there with the leaden
bullets aforesaid, by means of shooting off and discharging the said gun so
loaded, to, at, and against the said Mary Freeman, and by such striking,
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penetrating and wounding the said Mary Freeman, as aforesaid, one mortal
wound in and upon the left side of the said Mary Freeman, below the left
breast of the said Mary Freeman, of the depth of four inches, and of the
width of one inch, of which said mortal wound the said Mary Freeman, on
and from the said tenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and thirty-seven, until the eleventh day of April, in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven, at Edgefield court
house, in the district and State aforesaid, did languish, and languishing did
live, on which said eleventh day of April last aforesaid, about the hour of
five o'clock in the morning, she, the said Mary Freeman, at Edgefield court
house, in the district and State aforesaid, of the mortal wound aforesaid died
and so the jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths do say, that the said Wiley Free-
man, her, the said Mary Freeman, in manner and form aforesaid, feloniously
wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder, against the
peace and dignity of the same State aforesaid.1
The State v. Wiley Freeman
The grand jurors of the county of Edgefield accuse Wiley Freeman of
murder and charge that on or about March 15, 1956, Wiley Freeman
murdered Mary Freeman.2
MEANING OF "FAIRNESS"
At the outset, the meaning of the word "fairness" in the expres-
sion "fairness in accusation of crime" requires some explanation
"fairness" is something of a slippery word which can mean different
1. This is the first count of the indictment (in two counts, one for each
of two wounds) upheld in State v. Freeman, 1 Speers 57 (S.C. 1842), against
the contention that it insufficiently alleged that the defendant murdered the
victim because it did not expressly say that the gun was discharged. For
substantially similar murder indictments, see State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa 477
(1859) (eight counts), People v. Graham, 248 N.Y. 588, 162 N.E. 536 (1928),
as set out in Waite, Criminal Law and Its Enforcement 786 n. 68 (3d ed. 1947)
2. This is substantially in the form provided for in American Law Insti-
tute, Code of Criminal Procedure, §§ 152, 154, 188 (1930), hereafter referred
to in the notes as A.L.I. Code. Id. § 155, further provides that if the accusa-
tion (indictment or information) fails to inform the defendant of the particu-
lars of the offense sufficiently to enable him to prepare his defense, lie i,
entitled on request to a bill of particulars furnished by the prosecution.
Substantially similar short-form indictments have been upheld by the
courts (where the scheme similarly involves the furnishing of a bill of par
ticulars) Carter v. United States, 173 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1949)(Fed. R.
Crim. P., App. of Forms, containing forms for charging murder, fol-
lowed in this case, indictment alleged that Frank Carter, [on federal land]
on or about June 13, 1946, with premeditation stabbed and murdered Fernando
Cervantes) , State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646, 110 A.L.R. 1 (1936)
(state adopted A.L.I. Code on short form indictments by rules of court
indictment charged that Hyman Roy on September 20, 1934, at County ot
Bernanillo, State of New Mexico, did murder Martha Hutchinson. contrary
to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the
peace and dignity of the State of New Mexico) , People v. Bogdanoff, 254
N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890, 69 A.L.R. 1378 (1930) (state statute permitted short-
form indictments, indictment charged that Alexander Bogdanoff committed
"murder in the first degree contrary to Penal Law, section 1044," without
naming victim, date, place or means of producing death, which, however,
were furnished defendant in a bill of particulars filed by the district attorney)
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things in different settings. First of all, as used in this article, does
the word refer to fairness to the accused, or to the prosecution, or
to both? Surely it refers primarily to the accused, but that does not
mean that the niterests of the prosecution in the accusatory process
must be neglected entirely. Such interests also should be considered
in deciding what is fair in the procedure relating to criminal accusa-
tions. Fairness to the prosecution (meaning indirectly fairness to
the people of the stdte) requires that an accused who is* given
enough information to prepare his defense, who is not migled or
prejudiced by claimed defects in the accusation, and who has been
convicted on proper proof of the crime charged, should not go free
or require the state to undergo the time and expense of a new trial.
Thus "fairness" here does not necessarily mean an accusatory pro-
cedure which is the fairest possible to the accused.
At the other end of. the scale there is that mimmum standard of
fairness required by due process of law, imposed on the federal
government by the fifth amendment and on the states by the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Of course,
fairness as used in this article refers at least to this minimum
standard. Yet when we ask ourselves how certain ways of doing
things (in this article, the way in which the accusation should be
made in a criminal case) match up with our concepts of fairness,
we may quite properly demand a higher standard of procedure
than the minimum standard which due process requires.
Besides the vague phrase "due process", with its implied re-
quirement of fairness in accusation, almost all American jurisdic-
tions have a constitutional provision to the effect that the criminal
defendant is entitled to be informed of the charge against him. This,
too, though not as vague as "due process", is pretty indefinite when
it comes to applying it to specific accusations; but it also embodies
notions of fairness to the accused, much as "due process" does.
Then, too, most jurisdictions have constitutional provisions specifi-
cally requirmg indictments (or indictments or informations) in
criminal prosecutions, and while these constitutions do not spell out
what a criminal accusation must contain to qualify as an "indict-
ment" or "information", these two words by themselves impart
about the same notions of fairness as to accusation which the phrase
"due process" imparts. Many jurisdictions, in addition, have statu-
tory provisions relating to criminal accusations. Sometimes these
are rather vague commands to draftsmen to state the facts clearly
and concisely, avoiding unnecessary prolixity and repetition. These
statutes do not, of course, purport to authorize elimination of any
1957]
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allegations which fairness requires. Sometimes the statutes are
more specific, spelling out in effect the legislature's notions of what
fairness means, such as statutes requiring that the accusation list
the names of prosecution witnesses or requiring that the accused
be furnished a copy of the accusation in time to study it before his
arraignment. Very likely such statutes require a standard of fair-
ness somewhat higher than the command of due process.
Thus "fairness" in this article generally means something less
than the theoretically fairest possible method of accusation from
the accused's point of view, and something more than the minimum
standards of fairness as to accusation required by due process.
MODE OF AcCUSATION
Accusations of crime are of three types, depending on the
originating source of the accusation (1) The indictment (or pre-
sentment), a written document emanating from the grand jury 8
(2) The information, a written document originating in the prose-
cuting attorney without any action by a grand jury (3) The com-
plaint (used as an accusation in some states with respect to minor
crimes),4 a written document on oath preferred by a private indi-
vidual, sometimes the victim of the crime, sometimes a police officer
who witnessed the crime.5
In the federal courts all prosecutions for felony must be by in-
dictment, except that with non-capital felonies, the defendant may
waive his right to indictment and be tried on information, but an
3. The accusation is called an ndictiment when the prosecuting attorney
prepares the written charge and it is approved by the grand jury, which
signifies approval by finding it to be a "true bill." When the grand jury on
its own initiative prefers the charge, the accusation is termed a jresentncn .
4. In local parlance this is sometimes termed the "affidavit' or "infor-
mation" of some private person other than the prosecuting attorney. The
following cases hold that state law authorizes prosecution for minor crimes
in courts of limited jurisdiction on the complaint of a private citizen or police-
man rather than on the information of a district attorney- People v. Read,
132 Colo. 390, 288 P.2d 347 (1955) (any misdemeanor tried in justice court),
State v. Warner, 153 La. 557, 96 So. 120 (1923) (state liquor violations tried
in city court), People v. Wickes, 172 N.Y.Supp. 164 (County Ct. 1918)
(state traffic violations tried before city magistrate) , State v. Salmon, 90
Utah 512, 62 P.2d 1315 (1936) (any misdemeanor tried in justice court).
Contra, State v. Kelm, 79 Mo. 515 (1883) (no crime can be prosecuted on a
complaint). Cf. State ex rel. Knudson v. Municipal Court of Faribault, 164
Minn. 328, 205 N.W 63 (1925) (liquor offense involving maximum pumsh-
ment of 90 days and $300 fine requires information, implication that some
lesser crimes in justice court can be prosecuted on complaint). Even if a
complaint is an insufficient accusation for a misdemeanor prosecution, de-
fendant's failure to raise the question before pleading to the merits may
amount to a waiver. See annot., 61 A.L.R. 797, 802 (1929).
5. In the United States the finding of a coroner's jury in a death case
will not serve as a proper accusation in a homicide prosecution.
[Vol. 41:509
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information will suffice for a misdemeanor prosecution.0 About half
the states have indictment requirements substantially similar to
those of the federal government,7 but the other half now authorize
all or almost all felony prosecutions to be begun by reformation.a
The question arises whether fairness to the accused requires
prosecution for felony to be instituted by indictment in the absence
of waiver, or whether justice can still be done under a system of
prosecution by information. The Umted States Supreme Court long
ago held that the requirement of fundamental fairness embodied in
6. U. S. Const. amend. IV, requrng indictment for "infamous crime";
Fed. R. Crim. P. 7 (a), (b), restating "infamous crime" as 'crime pumsh-
able for a term exceeding one year", %.e., felony, "or at hard labor." Insofar
as misdemeanors are punishable at hard labor, prosecutions therefor must be
by indictment unless waived.
7. See A.L.L Code § 113 (1930) and comments thereon, listing the
constitutional and statutory requirements as to mode of accusation in the
various states.
In the states which require indictments for felonies the authorities are
split as to whether the defendant may waive this requirement. See annot.,
61 A.L.R. 797 (1929). Compare People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249
N.Y. 314, 164 N.E. 111, 61 A.L.R. 793 (1928) (no waiver, since right tc
prosecution by indictment is a right of the public as well as of the defendant)
with State v. Faile, 43 S.C. 52, 20 S.E. 798 (1895) (waiver, since right to
indictment is for the protection of the defendant alone). Fed. R. Crim. P.
7(b) allows waiver with non-capital felonies, and was upheld in Barkman
v. Sanford, 162 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1947).
8. See A.L.I. Code § 113 (1930) and comments thereon; note, 8 Stan.
L. Rev. 631 n. 2 (1956), listing the various states wluch authorize felony
prosecution by information as follows: (1) for all felonies, Arm, Ark., Cal.,
Colo., Idaho, Iowa, Kan., Mich., Mo., Mont, Neb., Nev., N.M., Okla., S.D
Utah, Wash., Wis., Wyo., (2) all felonies except those punishable by capital
punishment or life imprisonment, Conn., Vt., (3) all felomes except capital
felonies, Fla.; (4) all felonies except those punishable by life imprisonment,
Minn., (5) all felonies except murder or treaso n, Ind.
There has been a good deal of argument as to the desirability of allow-
ing felony prosecution by information. A.L.L Code § 113 (1930) favors
allowing the information. The Wickersham Commission, National Commis-
sion on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Prosecution 34-37
(1931), does too, arguing that the grand jury as an institution is expensive
and time-consuming; that the indictment method slows up the administration
of justice and gives the defendant the opportunity of raising purely technical
procedural issues; that indictments are more difficult to amend than infor-
mations; and that while originally the grand jury was considered an im-
portant check on the prosecuting attorney's hasty and unfounded action, in
practice the grand jury tends to be a rubber-stamp for the prosecuting attor-
ney's decisions. As to the latter point, it should be noted that most states
wuch authorize prosecution by information also require as a preliIn ary
step a preliminary examination before a magistrate or waiver thereof. See
A.L.I. Code § 115 (1930) so requiring, and comments thereon for constitu-
tional or statutory provisions so requiring. On the other hand, Dession, From
Indictment to Inforniation-Implcations of the Shift, 42 Yale L. J. 163
(1932), argues that the Wickersham Commission charges against the indict-
ment procedure are not proved.
In many of the states whuch allow the information procedure, the grandjury indictment procedure is not entirely eliminated but is still utilized in the
discretion of the prosecuting attorney in some situations. See note, 8 Stan. L
Rev. 631 (1956).
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the concept of due process of law is not violated by the information
mode of accusation.9 It may be argued that either method is fairer
than the other-as thd states seem to recognize by their almost
even split on the matter-but neither method is fundamentally un-
fair. No doubt, too, the view of some states that minor offenses
may be prosecuted by complaint is not so unfair as to come under
the ban of due process.
Whatever the mode of accusation-indictment, information or
complaint-it is always made in writing; doubtless notions of fair-
ness imposed by due process require this.
FUNCTION OF THE ACCUSATION
Most of the remaining issues concerning fairness in the ac-
cusatory process cannot properly be solved without first answering
the question What is the function of the criminal accusation? What
is it supposed to accomplish?
An old case in the United States Supreme Court lists the three
functions of the accusation in these words
The object of the indictment is [1] to furnish the ac-
cused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense, and [2] avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecu-
tion for the same cause, and [3] to inform the court of the
facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient
in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.10
9. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (state method of prosecu-
tion by information affer preliminary examination does not violate four-
teenth amendment due process). Il re Dolph, 17 Colo. 35, 28 Pac. 470 (1891),
held that information procedure does not violate the due process clause of
the state constitution. In the Dolph case it was further argued without success
that the alternative methods provided by the state-indictment or information
in the district attorney's discretion-violated the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment as discriminatory against those prosecuted by
information.
For many years a minority of the Supreme Court justices would require
the states, under fourteenth amendment due process, to utilize the criminal
procedure required of the federal government by the bill of rights, U.S.
Const. amend. I-VIII, including the fifth amendment requirement of ali
indictment. The high-water mark of this viewpoint was reached in Adainsoi
v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (state law allowing comment oii criinial
defendant's failure to take the stand held not a violation of fourteenth amend-
ment due process, Black, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge, JJ., dissenting because
fifth amendment self-incrimination would forbid comment in federal prosecu-
tions, and fourteenth amendment due process incorporates by reference self-
incrimination provision as well as all the rest of the bill of rights) Since
1947 the tide has receded, and only Black and Douglas would probably now
adhere to this view.
10. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1875). A more recent
case states the third reason in a little different form. "to enable the court, on
conviction or plea of nolo contendere or guilty to pronounce sentence accord-
ing to the rights of the case." State v. Greer. 238 N.C. 325. 327 77 S.E.2d
[Vol. 41:509
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'A recent Supreme Court case states the matter in terms of the first
-two rtasons; dropping the thlrd.31
There is no doubt that the first objective mentioned-that the
accui 66n: notify defendant of the charge against hin so that he
can prepare- Ins defense-is the basic function of the accusation.
The United States Constitution provides that in federal criminal
-prosecutions "the accused shall enjoy the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation. "12 Almost all the
states -have smilar provisions in their constitutions," and in the
few states which have no such constitutional provision it is still the
law that the accused must be informed.14 Furthermore, due process
"requires-m all criminal cases, federal or state, that the accused be
informed of the accusation.'
5
Does the second stated objective of the accusation-that it be
in such a form as to enable the defendant to raise the defense of
double" jeopardy if tried again for the same crime-impose on the
.accusation any requirement that the notice function does not? There
-are a number of situations where indictments have been considered
sufficient even though the indictments, together with the judgments
of conviction or acquittal, are not by themselves sufficient to sup-
port the plea of double jeopardy when that plea is made in a subse-
quent prosecution.' 6 In any such situation the defense of double
917, 919 (1953). Another way of expressing the third reason appears in
Report of Committee E of the American Institute of Crimmal Law &
Cr:mmology,-1 J. Crim. L., C., & P.S. 584, 587 (1910) as "the further office
of providing a formal basis for the judgment of conviction.
It is interesting to note that the function of civil pleadings is closely
analogous to that of criminal pleadings. "The courts have recognized that
the-function of pleadings under the Federal Rules is to give fair notice of the
claim asserted so as to enable the adverse party to answer and prepare for
trial, to allow for the application of the doctrine of res judicata, and to show
the type of case brought, so that it may be assigned to the proper form of
trial." Moore, Federal Practice § 8.13 (2d ed. 1948).
11. United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953).
12. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
13. See A.L.I. Code comments on §§ 154-55 (1930).
14. Ibid., listing Califorma, Idaho, Nevada, New York, and North
Dakota as having no constitutional provision. But all these states have statutes
requiring the accused to be informed. Ibid. Constitutional provisions requir-
ing prosecution by indictment, or by indictment or information, likewise have
been construed to require that the accused be informed of the charge against
him 'See annot, 69 A.L.R. 1392 (1930).
15. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S.
196 (1948) Both of these cases involved the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment as imposing on the states crimiial procedural requirements
as to notice.
16. Thus Millar, The Function of Crunmnal Pleading, 12 J. Crim. L., C.
; P.S. 500, 501 (1922) suggests this case: "Suppose X be indicted, by two
,separatt indictments, for two distinct acts of larceny, in respect qf like articles,
committed on different days. Under the rule that the prosecution, in its proof,
is not confined to the precise day alleged, it is possible, and has been from
-1957]
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jeopardy is of course still available, although resort must be had
to extrinsic evidence (usually the transcript of the record covering
the proof at the trial) to show the identity of the offense. But there
is no harm in that, it is well settled that extrinsic evidence may be
used to show identity of offense under a double jeopardy plea.17
Surely fairness requires that the defendant be able to show in some
relatively simple manner that the offense for which lie is being
prosecuted is the identical offense for which he was formerly
tried. It does not require that he prove the identity solely by refer-
ence to the accusation and judgment in the former prosecution.' 8
Protection against successive prosecutions for the same offense,
then, does not require of an accusation any more completeness than
the notice function demands.
The statement of the third objective of the accusation-that of
furnishing the court with enough information to enable it to de-
the earliest times, for the two indictments to be in identical language, includ-
ing identity in the statement of dates, and yet support the two convictions
if the offenses be in fact distinct. If they be in fact distinct, no one would
urge that X's conviction under the first is a bar to the second indictment, in
spite of the identity of averment. The rule is about as well settled as any
rule can be that parol evidence is admissible on the question of the identity
of the two offenses." People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890, 69
A.L.R. 1378 (1930), suggests this case: If the name of the victim of homicide
is unknown to the grand jury, the indictment may properly charge that de-
fendant committed murder on a person to the grand jury unknown. The
defendant is tried on this indictment and acquitted or convicted. If defendant
is subsequently charged in another indictment with the murder of X, lie
would have to resort to extrinsic evidence to prove that the X of the present
prosecution and the unknown person of the earlier prosecution are the same
person.
Most jurisdictions require the defendant to make a s ecial plea to raise
the issue of double jeopardy; a few allow the defense to be raised on a not-
guilty plea. Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 305-06 (1947)
17 The record, which in modern times includes the transcript of the
evidence as well as the pleadings and judgment, see Orfield, Criminal Appeals
in America 142 (1939), is, of course, the first place to look to solve a double
jeopardy issue. Where the record is ambiguous or incomplete, even parol
evidence outside the record may be used. See Dunbar v. United States, 156
U.S. 185, 191 (1895), where the Court stated. "It is true [on a plea of
former jeopardy] some parol testimony might be required to show the
absolute identity of the smuggled goods, but such proof is often requisite
to sustain a plea of once in jeopardy. [S]omething beside the record
might be required to identify the property mentioned in the two indictments."
On the whole subject, see 22 C.J.S. Crim. Law § 444 (1940).
18. Thus in State v. Brozich, 108 Ohio St. 559, 141 N.E. 491 (1923)
where defendant was indicted for stealing nine "rungs" and the proof showed
he stole nine rugs, his conviction of larceny of the rugs was upheld over his
contention that if he were later tried for stealing the same nine rugs he could
not show former jeopardy- "[T]he whole record does clearly show, for the
whole record is not made up solely of the indictment, but the evidence as
well, that the only property charged as having been stolen was 'rugs.' The
evidence would be available on such a plea of former jeopardy. "Id. at 563,
141 N.E. at 492. See Millar, note 10 supra, at 501 "And this rule [permitting
use of extrinsic evidence on a plea of double jeopardy] forms an abundant
safeguard to the acquitted or convicted defendant against later prosecution for
the same offense."
[Vol. 41:509
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cide whether the accusation is sufficient to support a conviction, or
to decide what punishment should follow a conviction, or to pro-
vide a formal basis for the judgment of convicton-lacks concrete-
ness and its meaning is difficult to understand. The statement that
the indictment must be sufficient to enable the court to decide
whether it will support a conviction 9 may almost be translated into
the indictment must be complete enough to enable the court to
decide whether it is complete enough, which hardly makes sense.
The need for "providing a formal basis for the judgment of con-
viction, so that the indictment or information must set forth everye"
thing which is necessary for a complete case on paper, no longer
serves any useful end, produces miscarriages of justice, and should
be done away with" in modem times when appellate review may
be had of the whole case at the trial, not just the parchment record
used in bygone days. 20 In short, while it is of some importance that
the court be enlightened as to the nature of the case, surely this
reason requires no more of an accusation than is required by the
basic function of notifying the accused.
An historical reason for requiring of a criminal accusation rigid
conformity to purely technical rules arose from the fact that in the
England of two centuries ago there were a great many capital crimes
-- one hundred and sixty as late as 1800. No wonder the judges
sought to soften the lot of the accused by raising technical objec-
tions wherever they could, whether in their treatment of the sub-
stantive law of crimes or in dealing with criminal procedure, in-
cluding that part of criminal procedure concerned with the require-
ments of the accusation. But while in those days one function of
the criminal charge was to make it so difficult to word that criminals
who did not deserve to be hanged would escape that punishment,
that function has disappeared altogether in modern times.2' There
is no doubt, however, that many modem courts have been reluctant
to disown the technical rules established by the precedents of that
era.
One other matter may be mentioned. A criminal defendant has
a constitutional right not to be convicted of a crime wich he may
have committed but of which he was not accused.23 If indictments
19. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
20. Report, supra note 10, at 587
21. See People v. Gilbert, 199 N.Y. 10, 92 N.E. 85 (1910), Perkans,
Short Indictments and Informations, 15 A.B.A.J. 292 (1929).
22. See Perkins, Absurdities it Crstsinal Procedure, 11 Iowa L. Rev.
297 (1926).
23. See heading Convtdion of Crime Charged on Proof of Crime
Charged, infra, p. 519.
19571
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or informations are stated too briefly, is it not possible for the
prosecuting attorney or the grand jury to have one crime in mind
when drafting or approving the accusation, while at the trial the
defendant is tried for and convicted of another crime?2 The New
York court dealt with a particularly short short-form indictment,
which alleged simply that the defendant committed murder in the
first degree, without stating the place, the date, the murder weapon,
or even the name of the victim. 25 Perhaps the grand jury means to
charge the defendant with the murder of X, but might not the trial
jury convict him of the murder of Y? The New York court an-
swered that even with the common law very-long-form indictments,
such a result is possible ;2 but that as long as the defendant has the
right to raise the question of what the grand jury had in mind in
accusing him, he is not prejudiced by the danger that he may be
convicted of a crime of which he was not accused, if he makes such
a challenge before conviction the prosecution must show that the
crime charged is the crime for which defendant is tried.
To conclude, it seems clear that the basic function of the crimi-
nal accusation is to inform the defendant so that he may defend
himself. No other possible function requires more of the accusation
than this notice function demands.
CONSEQUENCES Or INSUFFICIENT ACCUSATION
It will be shown, under the headings which follow, that courts
frequently declare that the accusation is bad because it leaves some-
thing out which should have been put in, or because it is not en-
tirely accurate in its allegations of fact or its spelling or grammar,
or because it is defective in some other manner. The consequences
of such bad pleading should, to a large extent, depend on how and
when the defendant raises his objections to it, and how far lie is
misled by it. Obviously, if the alleged rape victim's name is mis-
spelled, or if the property alleged to be stolen is tersely described
as "personal property", a defendant who complains before pleading
to the merits that the name ought to be properly spelled or that he
should be informed of what sort of property he is supposed to have
24. See State v. Murphy, 141 Mo. 267, 270, 42 S.W 936, 937 (1897)
"The charge must contain a certain description of the crime of which the
defendant is accused, and a statement of the facts by which it is constituted,
so as to identify the accusation, lest the grand jury should find a bill for one
offense, and the defendant be put upon his trial in chief for another, without
any authority."
25. People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890, 69 A.L.R. 1378
(1930).
26. The situations described note 16 supra are applicable here.
[Vol. 41:509
FAIR ACCUSATION
stolen .should be entitled to have the accusation corrected or the
,proper information otherwise furnished. But if, knowing of these
defects, he keeps his peace and proceeds to trial on the merits and
is convicted, he should not be entitled to have the judgment ar-
rested or on appeal have hIs conviction reversed without a real
showing that he was somehow misled and prejudiced in presenting
his defense. Thus if it is clear that during the trial he knows very
well who is the victim in the rape charge, or what particular ammal
he is charged with stealing in the larceny charge, he cannot be
prejudiced by the defective accusation. If he should learn of the
defect during the trial-if for some reason the misspelling of the
rape victm's name actually put him off the right track in preparing
his defense-then there would be far more reason for arresting
judgment or reversing on appeal, although even here perhaps a
continuance for a time necessary to prepare a proper defense would
be the more appropriate remedy. Some appellate courts have been
much too free with their reversals of convictions for defects which
could not have actually prejudiced the defendant in his defense.
Fairness to the defendant in such cases does not require a reversal.
Even if the defendant is not silent but complains before trial of
defects in the accusation, and even if the court refuses the relief
which it might properly give, it does not necessarily follow that his
conviction after a trial on the merits must be reversed. Fairness
requires only that the conviction be reversed if it can be shown that
he was misled by the defect in question.
On the other hand some defects may be of such an extreme
nature that it is quite proper to reverse the conviction. If A is
charged with rape of B, and the evidence shows that he robbed B
or raped C, surely there should be a reversal, where the crime
charged and the crime proved are so different in nature.
CONVICTION OF CRIME CHARGED ON PROOF OF CRIME CHARGED
It is a fundamental principle of procedural due process that one
cannot be convicted of a crime of which he was not accused, so that
an accused who is charged with one crime cannot be convicted of
another crime not charged even if at the trial the proof shows he
committed the latter crime. Thus a defendant charged with crime
A cannot be convicted of crime B on proof of crime B.Y So, too,
where the charge is crime A and the proof is crime A, there can
27. See Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) "It is a violation
of due process to send an accused to prison following conviction of a charge
on which he was never tried. "
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be no conviction of crime B.28 Likewise if the charge is crime A
and the proof is crime B, defendant cannot be convicted of crime A.23
However, even under the rule that one cannot be charged with
crime A and convicted of crime B, a defendant charged with first
degree murder can in most jurisdictions be convicted of second
degree murder or manslaughter or perhaps battery, on a charge of
assault with intent to kill there can be a conviction of simple assault,
and so also of a charge of robbery and conviction of larceny or
assault, and a variety of other possibilities.3 0 This is because the
charge of a greater crime or a crime of a greater degree necessarily
includes a charge of "lesser included offenses" or offenses of a lesser
degree. The theory is that an accusation of the greater crime (e.g.
robbery) necessarily also charges the elements of the lesser crime
(e.g., assault and larceny), so that an accusation charging robbery
really charges not only robbery, but larceny and assault as well,
although not specifically named.31
The difficulty sometimes encountered in applying the above rules
arises from the necessity to distinguish between separate though
closely related and similarly punished crimes on the one hand, and
separate ways of committing a single crime on the other, especially
28. Clark v. State, 197 Tenn. 67, 270 S.W.2d 361 (1954), where defend-
ant was charged with bigamous cohabitation, the proof showed bigamous
cohabitation, but the conviction was of bigamy. The statute provides that if
a married person remarries while his former spouse is alive, or cohabits with
such second spouse, he shall be imprisoned not less than 2 nor more than 21
years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-701 (1956).
29. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). Here defendant's conviction
of crime A on a charge of crime A was affirmed by the state supreme court
on the ground that the evidence showed he committed crime B. On remand,
the state supreme court again affirmed on the ground the evidence showed
he committed crime A. See 214 Ark. 387, 216 S.W2d 402 (1949).
30. The common law rule authorizing conviction of lesser included
offenses has been enacted into statute form in many states. See A.L.I. Code
§ 348 (1930), and commentaries thereon. A smaller number of states by
statute authorize a conviction of attempted crime on a charge of the com-
pleted crime, a matter which the common law found difficult to allow, on the
theory that attempt requires failure, which the completed crime does not.
Fed. R. Crim. P 31(c) authorizes conviction of a lesser included offense or
attempt.
31. See notes, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 888 (1956) , 11 Wis. L. Rev. 413
(1936), for the different views of the various states construing the common
law or statutory law as to when a lesser crime is necessarily included in a
greater crime. A.L.I., Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. 5 § 1.08(4) (1956),
with commentary thereon, provides for a rather broad definition of lesser
included offense, justifying the result on the basis of fairness both to the
accused and the prosecution. "a basic premise of the draft is that it is
desirable, where possible, to adjudicate the entire criminal liability of the
defendant in a single trial. " The notion that it is a benefit to the accused
to adjudicate his entire criminal liability in one trial tends, however, to con-
flict with the notion that fairness requires defendant to be convicted only of
the crime or crimes charged against him.
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where the two are given the same name in the same sentence of the
same section of the criminal code. If a statute provides that "who-
ever having a living spouse marries, or whoever having so married
cohabits with the second spouse, is guilty of bigamy", are bigamy
and bigamous cohabitation two separate crimes (crime A and crime
B in the rules stated above) or are they simply two ways of com-
mitting one crime? The same problem may arise with statutes
punishing, as forgery, both forging instruments and uttering forged
instruments5 2
To some extent at least, the legislature can take two or more
related matters and either make them into two or more separate
crimes or make them into a single crime which may be committed
in different ways or under different circumstances. At common law
burglary was the breaking and entering of a dwelling house of an-
other at night with intent to commit a felony therein. Today most,
if not all, jurisdictions have expanded the scope of burglary to
include buildings other than dwellings and to include daytime opera-
tions as well as those in the night. Conceivably these legislative
changes might have been accomplished by creating new crimes with
new names, leaving burglary as previously defined. But actually
burglary has simply been expanded. The experience with larceny
has been different. When the legislature in England decided that
wrongful appropriations of property belonging to another ought to
be punished even in the absence of a "trespass m the taking', it
created the new crimes of embezzlement and false pretenses, instead
of extending larceny to cover the new types of misappropriation.
Undr such a tri-partite arrangement, which is followed in most of
the states m the United States, procedural difficulties often arise
because of the basic rule that one can be convicted only of the
crime charged on proof of the crime charged. Thus one charged
with larceny cannot be convicted of embezzlement on proof of em-
bezzlement 33 But a few states have provided in effect that whoever
32. Thus Clark v. State, 197 Tenn. 67, 270 S.W2d 361 (1954), holds
bigamy to be a separate crime from bigamous cohabitation. But People v.
Frank, 28 Cal. 507 (1865), holds that forgery of an instrument and uttering
a forged instrument are two ways of committing one offense, forgery. See
also Wright v. People, 116 Colo. 306, 181 P2d 447 (1947). Compare this
form of statute: whoever commits perjury (defining it), or whoever suborns
another to commit perjury, is guilty of perjury or subornation of perjury, as
the case may be. Here obviously perjury and subornation are tvo separate
crimes.
33. Even legislation authorizing conviction of embezzlement on proof
of embezzlement upon a charge.of larceny has failed, the statute being held
unconstitutional. State v. Harmon, 106 Mo. 635, 18 S.V. 128 (1891) (the con-
stitutional requirement of indictment requires that conviction be of crime
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commits (1) larceny or (2) embezzlement or (3) false pretenses is
guilty of a single crime named theft (or larceny) 11 The most ambi-
tious work of combining several different but related crimes into a
single crime is found in the Model Penal Code proposal to lump
together into one grand crime called theft not only larceny, em-
bezzlement and false pretenses, but receiving stolen property, rob-
bery, blackmail and extortion as well. 35 What were formerly distinct
offenses are, under this plan, simply different ways a criminal can'
commit the one offense of making off with another's property,
whether it be by stealth or force or threats or fraud.
There must of course be some limits to how much combining
the legislature can constitutionally do. No doubt all crimes could not
be combined into a single great crime. Doubtless too large segments
of the whole field of crime such as all crimes against the person (or
all crimes against property, or against the administration of justice,
or against the government, or other such broad category) could not
be combined into a single large crime. The difficulty would be in the
requirement that defendant must be informed of the charge against
him. A statute combining such distinct crimes as perjury, aiding a
prisoner to escape and bribing jurymen (and thirty others) into the
one large crime of hindering the administration of justice, and pro-
viding that a charge of obstructing justice can be supported by
proof of perjury or bribery of a juror or aiding a prisoner to
escape, etc., would not give the defendant fair warning of what he
must defend against. The Model Penal Code proposal, though
pretty broad, is, however, quite different from the groupings just
charged). Cf. State v. Gould, 329 Mo. 828, 46 S.W.2d 886 (1932) Because of
narrow technical distinctions between larceny and embezzlement and between
larceny (by trick) and false pretenses, the fact that there are three crimes
where one ought to grow makes the procedural difficulties especially acute.
See Scott, Larceny, Embezzlement and False Pretenses ti Colorado-A Ncedfor Consolidation, 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 446 (1951).
34. Id. at 451, citing statutes from Arizona, California, Louisiana. Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New York and Washington. The new Wiscon-
sin Criminal Code § 943.20 (1955) is a similar statute. One difficulty such
statutes have encountered in New York, Minnesota, Montana and Washigtoil
is that the courts dealing with them still like to think of the three as three
separate crimes instead of a single crime, e.g., People v. Dumar, 106 N.Y. 502,
13 N.E. 325 (1887) (indictment for "stealing" property; proof showed false
pretenses, convicted of the single crime called larceny; held, reversed, since
indictment made a noise like larceny whereas proof showed false pretenses)
California, Louisiana and Massachusetts have upheld their statutes against
the contention that they are unconstitutional because the defendant is not
informed of the charge against him unless he is told the particular one of the
three crimes with which he is charged. Scott, op. cit. supra note 33, at 452.
35. A.L.I. Model Penal Code, art. 206, Tent. Draft No. 2 (1954) Sec-
tion 206.60 provides that an accusation of theft may be supported by proof
of any one of the sundry formerly distinct crimes.
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suggested, both in-regardto the number of separate crimes involved
in the- consolidation and in the closeness of the relationship between
the sundry crimes to be .combifned.
CONTENTS OF THE ACCUSATION
Undoubtedly the most numerous and difficult questions concern-
ing criminal accusations have to do with their contents. How should
they be-worded? How accurate must they be? How much detail is
required? If the defendant is to be accused of theft of property, for
instance, how must the property be described? Is it enough to say
that A stole "property" "belonging to B, or must the property be
further described? If so, is it enough for the accusation to state that
A stole- "an animal" or must- it be more specific-"a horse"-or
even more specific-"a mare"-or still more specific--"a grey
mare"--or "a grey mare named Mary"-or must Mary's age be
given, plus some other particulars, such as the fact that Mary has
a lame foreleg -i It can be easily seen that the more detailed the
charge, the more likely is the chance of a variance between the
charge and the proof, with the possibility that the defendant's con-
viction must be reversed, as where Mary in the example above, al-
leged to be a mare, turns out at the trial to be a geldingY7
How specific should the accusation be as to time and place of
the alleged crime? How far should it go in describing the means
used to commit a crime, such as the weapon used and the wounds
received in homicide cases? How far must the accusation go in
negativing possible defenses, such as self-defense in murder or
lack of a medical reason to save life in abortion? What should be
the consequences of clerical errors, misspellings of names and the
like?
To answer these questions concerning the amount of detail and
accuracy which fairness requires of a criminal accusation, we must
bear in mind the basic function of the accusation. it must give the
36. Korab v. State, 93 Neb. 66, 139 N.W 717, 1915B L.RA. 83 (1913),
held insufficient an indictment charging receiving stolen property where the
property was described as "the personal property" of X of the value of $48.
Hemphill v. State, 52 Okla. Crim. 419, 6 P.2d 450 (1931), held that an indict-
ment for the statutory crime of "larceny of domestic fowls", which indictment
charged that A stole "domestic fowls", was insufficient because it did not
allege what sort of fowls-cluckens, turkeys, geese, ducks or whatever. See
dictum in State v. Cornellison, 166 Tenn. 106, 59 SAV.2d 514 (1933), that it
is sufficient to allege that A stole B's "horse." See as to the description
necessary to describe stolen automobile, anmot., 100 A.L.RL 791 (1936).
37 Compare Marsh v. State, 3 Ala. App. 80, 57 So. 387 (1912) (statute
made it larceny to steal cow or animal of the cow kind, proof of larceny of
steer; conviction reversed).
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defendant enough information to enable him to prepare his defense. 8
It is rather obvious from looking at the two forms of murder in-
indictment quoted at the beginning of this article that giving proper
notice is not a mere matter of the number of words used.
Stating the Elements of the Crime
It is quite commonly asserted that the accusation, to be suffi-
cient, must allege all the essential elements of the crime charged."
In a larceny accusation it is not enough to allege that A "stole"
B's hog. It must be stated that A "wrongfully took and carried
away B's hog against B's will and without B's consent, with a
felonious intent to convert the hog to his own use, and to perma-
nently deprive B of the hog." 40 A perjury accusation, to be suf-
ficient, cannot allege simply that defendant committed perjury
(setting forth his words), but rather that the defendant, having
duly taken an oath before a competent tribunal, wilfully made a
false statement (setting forth the statement) as to a fact material
to the hearing.4 Where statutory rape is defined "if a male
person over 16 carnally knows a female person of previous chaste
character, not his wife, under 16", the accusation cannot charge
simply that John Smith committed statutory rape on Mary
Jones, but must allege that John was over 16, that Mary was not
John's wife, that Mary was of previous chaste character,' 2 and
38. See heading Function of the Accusation p. .rpra. It was there
seen that another function of the accusation is to enable defendant to prove
double jeopardy if he should be later prosecuted for the same crime. Obvious-
ly allegations that A stole B's "old grey mare named Mary" would require
less resort to the record of the trial than if the charge alleged that A stole
B's "horse", but we saw that there is no harm in a rule requiring defendant
to use the record to prove that the later prosecution is for the "same offense."
39. E.g., United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953), Slusher v.
Commonwealth, 267 Ky. 140, 101 S.W.2d 663 (1937) , State v. Navarro, 131
Me. 345, 163 Atl. 103 (1932) , State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 77 S.E.2d 917(1953), State v. Davis, 39 R.I. 276, 97 Atl. 818, 1918C Ann. Cas. 563 (1916),
State v. Ray, 122 WVa. 39, 7 S.E.2d 654 (1940). See Millar, The Function
of Criminal Pleading, 12 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 500 (1922), as to "the rule
of judicial law that the accusation shall express all the constituent elements
of the offense charged."
40. Slusher v. Commonwealth, note 39 supra.
41. United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953), holding, however,
that the perjury accusation need not give the name of the person administer-
ing the oath or his authority to administer the oath, as these are not elements
of the offense.
42. State v. Ray, 122 W Va. 39, 7 S.E2d 654 (1940) One judge dis-
sented as to the requirement that the charge must allege the defendant to be
over 16, on the ground the defendant need not be informed of his own age to
prepare his defense. It would seem that he need not be told he is a male
person, and it would seem that if he is charged with rape of Mary Jones, he
is informed that his victim is a female I
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perhaps even that John was a male person and Mary a female
person.
The requirement that all the elements must be stated is general-
ly met, in the usual case of an accusation for a crime defined by
statute, by stating the allegations literally or substantially in the
language of the statute. Thus if the statute provides that "whoever
offers money or other consideration to a public official of the
executive, legislative or judicial branch of government, with intent
to influence him in the performance of his official duties, is guilty
of bribery", an accusation of bribery worded along these lines will
do. But if a statute should simply provide that "whoever commits
bribery is punishable" by a stated punishment, an accusation that
A "bribed" B, though in the language of the statute, is insufficient,
as it does not state the elements of the crime of bribery 43
A number of states have statutes providing that criminal accusa-
tions shall state the facts constituting the crime m ordinary and
concise language.44 Such statutes, however, have not generally been
construed to do away with the requirement that the accusation must
state the elements of the offense.45 Indeed, by emphasizing facts
they seem to imply that conclusions of law will not do, and doubt-
less a statement that defendant "stole" or "robbed" is a conclusion
of law. A number of states, however, have more specific statutes
doing away with the elements requirement; and several states have
legislation setting forth specific forms for indictment, some of
which forms are worded according to the name of the crime without
setting forth the elements of the crime, such as "A stole from B one
horse" or "A robbed B" or "A raped B" or "A committed perjury
by testifying as follows "Y40
Is an accusation unfair to the accused which names the crime
but does not state all the material elements of the crime? Is A really
less able to defend himself if he is charged with "stealing" B's hog
43. State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 77 S.E.2d 917 (1953).
44. A.L.L Code (1930), commentaries on §§ 154-55.
45. E.g., State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 77 S.E2d 917 (1953).
46. A.L.I. Code § 154 (1930) provides in effect that the elements of
the crime need not be alleged, and § 188 sets forth various short forms which
do not set forth the elements. The commentaries on § 188 state that Alabama,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Micugan, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
and West Virginia have adopted schedules of forms. Of these states the
forms in Louisiana, Michlgan, and O1io are practically identical with the
A.L.I. Code § 188 forms, the others are longer. A.L.I., Code of Criminal
Procedure: Legislative Recognition (1948) lists the following states as
adopting § 154 or § 188 or both: Arizona §§ 154, 188), Connecticut § 154,
§ 188 in part), Iowa (§ 154), New Mexico (§§ 154, 188 by court rules),
Noirth Dakota (§ 154), Rhode Island (§§ 154, 188), Utah (§ 154, § 188 in
substance).
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than if he is charged with "wrongfully taking and carrying away"
B's hog "against B's will and without his consent, with a felonious
intent to convert the hog to his own use and to permanently deprive
B of said hog"? It would seem that the usual defendant will be as
well informed in one case as in the other. If he has the name of the
crime but does not know its elements, he or his counsel can look
up its definition in the statute. Frequently crimes are defined in
statutes in a peculiar manner. It would seem that a defendant is
better informed of the charge if he is accused of "murder" than if
he is accused of an "unlawful and felonious killing of another with
malice aforethought, express or implied." The short form accusa-
tion has been upheld by the courts of several of the states which
have adopted it,' 7 and surely the fairness requirements of due
process are not violated by such an accusation. But assuming that
it is conceivable that in some situations a defendant may be preju-
diced in his defense at the trial by a short-form accusation which
does not spell out the material elements, the defendant should not
be entitled to a new trial after conviction without a showing that
he did not know what the prosecution involved or was otherwise
prejudiced.48
A common practice in drafting a criminal accusation is to set
forth (1) the name of the crime and then (2) the facts, stated in
terms of the elements of the crime. Sometimes the crime named and
the crime whose elements are spelled out do not jibe, as where the
accusation charges defendant with "burglary, in that he did "
and then the accusation proceeds to set forth facts constituting lar-
47 State v. Henderson, 215 Iowa 276, 243 N.W 289 (1932), State v.
Nichols, 216 La. 622, 44 So.2d 318 (1950), State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60
P.2d 646, 110 A.L.R. 1 (1936), People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E.
890, 69 A.L.R. 1378 (1930).
Short form accusations depart from the traditional forms in two respects
(1) they omit the elements of the crime (discussed here) , and (2) they omit
many details (discussed p. 529 infra).
48. In People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890, 69 A.L.R. 1378
(1930), the indictment charged simply that defendants committed murder,
without naming the victim, but at the trial the evidence showed defendants
murdered Fechter. Defendants on appeal claimed they were not properly
informed of the charge. But as defendants well understood all along that
Fechter was meant, and never claimed otherwise, they can "point to no sub-
stantial right, guaranteed to them by the Constitution, which has been
prejudiced by failure to state in the indictment all the essential elements of the
crime charged." A proper appellate court attitude toward short accusations
is expressed in State v. Ramsauer, 140 Mo. App. 401, 124 S.W 67 (1910)
where the indictment was not specific as to time or place; the court affirmed
the conviction against defendant's claim that the indictment failed to notify
him of the charge, saying" "There is no pretense in this case that he did not
as a matter of fact know what the charge against him was. The record shows
that he did make his defense. The jury has found apainst hin as the result of
a trial which, as shown by the record, was fair and impartial. "
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ceny, not burglary. It is generally held in such cases that the accu-
sation is good; it is the crime contained in the statement of facts
which controls. 9 It would seem that the situation is at least as apt
to be confusing to the defendant as where the crime is simply
named and the elements not set forth.
Negatimng defenses
Assuming, however, that an accusation must set forth all the
essential elements of the crime charged, there is the problem of
what are the essential elements. In particular, is the lack of a de-
fense which the substantive criminal law may allow for the particu-
lar crime charged an element of the crime which must be alleged
in the first instance (and proved at the trial in the second instance)?
Or is such a defense a sort of "afirmative defense" which the de-
fendant must raise, just as a civil defendant must raise defenses
like contributory negligence, duress and fraud? Thus with a murder
charge must the accusation allege not only that A murdered B but
also that A was sane and did not act in self-defense against Bl
It may be well to note that defenses to crime come in different
forms. There are those great substantive law defenses, recognized
in appropriate situations by all Anglo-American jurisdictions, ap-
plicable to more than one crime, and which are not generally set
forth in the statutes defining particular crimes-insanity, mtoxdca-
lion, infancy, compulsion, self-defense, accident, mistake of fact or
law, and perhaps entrapment. A statute defining criminal battery
may say that "battery is the unlawful beating of another person",
it does not go on to state" .. by one who is sane, over the age of
seven, who was not compelled by threat of death or serious bodily
injury, who was not acting m self-defense", etc. Then there are
those-defenses which are applicable to a particular crime and which
are set forth in more or less close connection with the statute de-
fining the crime. A statute may define rape as a male person's forci-
ble sexual intercourse with a female person "not lus wife", it is a
defense if the female is his wife. An abortion statute may define
abortion as the use of drugs or instruments on a woman "quick
with child" with intent to procure a miscarriage; "provided, how-
ever", that if done on a doctor's advice to save the woman's life, it
is not a crime. Under such a statute it is a defense if she is not
pregnant, or if the act is done on a doctor's advice in order to save
her life. A statute may make it a crime for any person "except a
physician" to possess a hypodermic syrmge. The typical bigamy
49. See anot, 121 A.L. 1088 (1939).
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statute defines the crime as the marrying again by one who has a
living spouse, excepting, however, a remarriage after seven years'
absence of the spouse or after a divorce from such spouse. Must the
indictment charging A with raping B allege that B was not A's
wife? Must the indictment charging A with possessing a hypodermic
syringe allege that A is not a physician? Must the bigamy charge
allege not only that A, with a spouse B, married C, but also that A
did not wait seven years and was not divorced ?50
The various jurisdictions have adopted two rules to solve such
questions (1) the rule of location if the exception appears in the
enacting clause of the statute, the absence of such an exception must
be pleaded in the accusation, while if it appears in a subsequent
clause or section or statute, the absence need not be pleaded ;51 (2)
the "necessarily descriptive" rule if the exception is so incorporated
in the language of the statute defining the crime that the elements
of the offense cannot be accurately described if the exception is
omitted, the accusation must negative the exception, otherwise it
need not.5 2 The two rules tend to come together; thus, if an excep-
tion is found in the enacting clause, it tends to be considered a neces-
sary description of the offense, though "necessarily descriptive" is
a vague expression. Applying these rules, all jurisdictions would
agree that a murder accusation need not allege that defendant is
sane and that he did not kill in self-defense. On the other hand, it
would seem that the accusation for A's rape of B must allege that B
is not A's wife,5" though a statement that A raped B, "an unmarried
50. An analogous problem, but not within the scope of this article, is as
to the proof at the trial-the burden of going forward with some evidence
and the burden of persuasion. It seems clear that if the prosecution must allege
the fact that the rape victim is not defendant's wife, it has the burden at the
trial of going forward and of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that she is
not his wife. If the sanity of the defendant need not be alleged, neither at the
trial need it be proved by the prosecution, unless the defendant comes forward
by introducing some proof of insanity; the prosecution must then prove him
sane, though the courts are quite evenly split on the measure of the burden
of persuasion on the prosecution, whether beyond a reasonable doubt or by apreponderance of the evidence. State v. Clark, 34 Wash. 485, 76 Pac. 98(1904).
51. The leading case for this view is Commonwealth v. Hart, 11 Cush.
130 (Mass. 1853), pointing out a difficult middle class of cases, where the
enacting clause says "except as hereafter provided" and a later clause or
statute sets out the exceptions.
52. The leading case for this view is United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. 168(1872).
For an exhaustive discussion of the rules and their application, see
annot., 153 A.L.R. 1218 (1944). The location rule is generally preferred be-
cause of its simplicity. See Commonwealth v. Meeks, 192 Ky. 690, 234 S.W
292 (1921).
53. People v. Miles, 9 Cal. App. 312, 101 Pac. 525 (1908), Young v.
Territory, 8 Okla. 525, 58 Pac. 724 (1899) ("necessarily descriptive" test)
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woman", ought to do as well. It is generally agreed that with an
accusation of abortion, the fact that there was no necessity to save
life must be alleged.54 But mn bigamy prosecutions the seven years'
absence and lack of divorce need not be alleged.3
What does fairness require of an accusation in respect to pos-
sible defenses? Specifically, if an accusation fails to allege the ab-
sence of a defense, which is provided for m the enacting clause or
which is necessarily descriptive of the crime, is the defendant en-
titled to have the accusation dismissed before trial? Or, is he en-
titled to a new trial after conviction on the merits? The answer on
principle is the same as with the answer to the question concerning
accusations winch name the crime but do not spell out the elements
if the defendant is not misled by the absence of the allegation, he is
entitled to no more relief than the amendment of the accusation
when he asks for it. So if John Jones is accused of raping Mary
Smith, it is almost inconceivable that he can be helped in his de-
fense by an allegation that Mary is not his wife. If anyone knows
that fact, it is surely the defendant himself. This is the theory of
the Institute Code of Criminal Procedure,"6 which seems eminently
sound.
Details
A criminal accusation may be worded so as to spell out a great
many details, or it may be pretty sparse as to details. The first
murder indictment set forth at the beginning of this article tells the
defendant that he is a laborer, that he shot his victim with a $10.00
rifle loaded with two bullets, that the bullets were made of lead,
that he not only struck her with the bullets but also penetrated and
wounded her on a particularly described part of her body, that the
wound was of a certain depth and width, and then it goes on to
describe her living for a time, languishing and finally dying of the
wound. Another count of the same indictment, even longer than
the first, mentions all these matters in connection with the shooting
of the second bullet, adding this time that he did not have the fear
54. State v. McIntyre, 19 Minn. 93 (1872) (location test). State v.
Stokes, 54 Vt. 179 (1881) ("necessarily descriptive" test).
55. Stanglem v. State, 17 Ohio St. 453 (1867) (location test). State v.
Reilly, 88 N.J.L. 104, 95 Atl. 1005 (1915) ("necessarily descriptive" test),
Corvin v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 649, 108 S.E. 651, 39 A.L.R. 592 (1921)
(under either test).
56. A.L.I. Code § 175 (1930), a rule followed by statute or court rules
in a few states. In addition several jurisdictions have specific statutes, creat-
ing crimes with exceptions, providing that as to the particular crime the
absence of exceptional circumstances need not be alleged. See annot., 153
A.L.R. 1218, 1221 (1944).
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of God before his eyes but was instead seduced by the devil I Surely
all these details need not be stated. Surely, too, there is no need for
two counts, one for each wound. The second indictment above
names the crime but does not spell out the details, other than the
date and the victim. There is nothing of the defendant's occupation,
or the weapon, or the wound.
What does fairness demand of the accusation so far as details
are concerned? It is commonly asserted that a detailed recital of
the evidence by which the accused's guilt will be established at the
trial is not required.57 On the other hand, he must be informed of
enough to make his defense (and, it is often added, to be able to
plead double jeopardy if tried later for the same crime) .5 The
common statute or rule of court providing that the accusation shall
be a simple and concise statement of the facts 9 constitutes perhaps
an invitation to cut out some details, but it is so vaguely expressed
as to give little guidance. A clearer invitation is involved in those
few statutes relating to homicide which provide that it is not neces-
sary to allege the means of producing death, or those statutes relat-
ing to crimes generally, which provide that the means of committing
crimes need not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense,
such as in the case of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon.0'
The theory of the Institute Code is to avoid questions of specificity
of detail by providing in effect that details may, but need not, be
alleged,61 and that if the defendant wants more details to prepare
his defense, he can have them by asking for them in a demand for a
bill of particulars.62 It may be said that little is accomplished by
providing that details need not be furnished in the accusation as
long as they are expressed in a bill of particulars. Why not require
such an expression in one place rather than in either one of two
57 E.g., People v. Quider, 172 Mich. 280, 137 N.W 546 (1912)
58. Ibid.
59. See note 44 supra.
60. See A.L.I. Code § 160 (1930), and commentaries thereon. Fed. R.
Crinm. P 7(c) does not go so far; it provides that alternative means may bejoined in a single count. But the forms appended thereto do not require a
statement of means in homicide cases. The statutes eliminating means from
homicide cases do not unfairly deprive the defendant of information necessary
for his defense. Goersen v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. 388 (1882).
61. A.L.I. Code § 154 (1930), providing that the accusation is sufficient
if it gives the common law or statutory name of the crime, § 188, setting
forth specific forms. See note 46 mpra for states with similar provisions.
62. A.L.I. Code § 155 (1930), providing that the court may of its own
motion, and shall at defendant's request, order the prosecution to furnish the
defendant with a bill of particulars as to details necessary to prepare a defense.
Unlike the above provision, the common law did not give the defendant the
right to demand particulars, the furnishing of particulars was within the
court's discretion if it existed at all. Orfield. Criminal Procedure from \rrest
to Appeal 240 (1947).
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places ?63 The answer is that under the Institute plan the defendant
cannot-have the accusation dismissed before trial or have his con-
viction reversed after trial because of a lack of detail which he may
already know or at least may learn of by asking for it. Even under
the Institute plan a backward-loolang court might very well undo
the good which the plan aims to accomplish. Such a court may hold
that details are necessary under the constitutional requirements of
an indictment or information or under the constitutional provision
requiring that the defendant be informed of the charge, and that a
bill of particulars cannot supply any matter wich the accusation
itself must contain.6 But short-form accusations provided for by
legislation which also provides for the right to demand a bill of
particulars have been upheld.65 As far as fairness is concerned, such
a plan presupposes giving to the defendant all the information and
time he needs to prepare his defense, which is of course all that fair-
ness requires. All he loses is the opportunity to raise technical ob-
jections before or, what is worse, after trial, with the object, not of
defending himself on the merits, but of delaying or escaping al-
together his deserved punishment. Fairness to the accused requires
no such result, and fairness to the people of the state positively
revolts at the idea. A recent Texas case indicates the absurdities
which courts may perpetrate m requiring details unless they bear in
mind that fairness is concerned with furnishing information for the
purpose of making a defense. A was charged -with murder of B by
drowning B, and the proof showed that he drowned her in the deep
waters of a bar pit. His conviction was reversed because the accusa-
tion failed to tell him that he drowned her in water; it might have
been alcohol or milk or some other liquid 1oC
63. Ibid.
64. E.g., State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 77 S.E2d 917 (1953), where the
statute provided that it is a crime to bribe, and the indictment alleged that
the defendant bribed a named official, without setting forth the elements of the
crime. See note 43 .supra and text thereto. This "fatal defect in an indictment
is not cured by the statute which enables the defendant to call for a bill of
particulars", nor by a statute providing for expressing the charge in a plain.
intelligible and explicit manner. The court ended on a lofty note, speaking
of its rule as "the last hope and only asylum of persecuted innocence." Very
likely, however, if the accusation charges crime A, and a bill of particulars
sets forth crime B, a conviction of crime A or B would be properly reversed.
See Wright v. People, 104 Colo. 335, 91 P.2d 499, 123 A.L.R. 474 (1939).
65. See note 47 .rupra.
66. On rehearing, the court backed down a little, stating that perhaps
"drowning" ordinarily does imply the use of water, but the indictment was
still bad because it did not allege that A pushed B into the water from the
bank, or from a boat, or held her head under; or, if the exact details were
unknown, so alleging. Gragg v. State, 148 Tex. Cnm. 267, 186 S.V.2d 243(1945).
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Details of Time and Place
Many cases have dealt with questions concerning what is re-
quired of an accusation in respect to allegations of time and place.
Must the date of the crime be mentioned at all? If so, will "on or
about" a certain date do, or must it allege a specific date ? Must the
hour of the day be given, or even the minute? What is the result of
alleging the wrong time? Similar questions arise as to place. Must
the place be named, if so, the county, or the town, or the street
address?
Strangely enough, the common law, although it required the
accusation to mention some date, 7 did not require that the prosecu-
tion stick to that date, proof of any other date within the period of
the statute of limitations would suffice to convict.0 8 The rule ap-
parently applied without regard to whether the defendant was mis-
led in his defense. It would seem that if he is so misled, fairness
requires at least that the defendant be able to obtain a postpone-
ment until he can reprepare his defenses. 69 However, fairness does
not require reversal of a conviction of a defendant who is not mis-
led by a clerical error in the accusation charging him with commit-
ting the crime on a date subsequent to the date of the accusation. 7
The dangers of misleading are greater, it would seem, if the allega-
tion is an incorrect but plausible date than if it is an impossible or
future date or if no date at all is given. The heights of absurdity
were reached in a case which arrested a judgment of conviction
charging the commission of an offense on July 15, 1855, because the
letters "A.D" were omitted.7" The defendant might have been mis-
led into working up his defense on the theory that he was charged
with committing the offense in 1855 B.C. I The complete absence of
67 State v. Beaton, 79 Me. 314, 9 Atl. 728 (1887) (indictment alleged
an offense on sundry days between September 23 and September 30, 1855)
68. Applied in Chandler v. State, 25 Fla. 728, 6 So. 769 (1889) (accusa-
tion charged offense in September, proof showed offense in February) , State
v. Morin, 149 Me. 279, 100 A.2d 657 (1953) (accusation charged June 8 of-
fense, proof showed April 15 offense) Allegations of a future date or anl
impossible date, however, like absence of allegations of any date, render the
accusation bad, People v. Van Every, 222 N.Y. 74, 118 N.E. 244, 7 A.L.R.
1507 (1917), though a specific statute may cure such defects. State v. Craw-
ford, 99 Mo. 74, 12 S.W 354 (1889).
69. A.L.I. Code § 184(3) (1930) so provides.
70. Compare People v. Van Every, 222 N.Y. 74, 118 N.E. 244, 7 A.L.R.
1507 (1917) , Elmore v. State, 126 Tex. Crim. 519, 73 S.W.2d 107 (1934)
State v. Runyon, 100 WVa. 647, 131 S.E. 466 (1926), all holding such an
indictment defective, with Lucas v. United States, 188 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir.
1951), People v. Myers, 1 Cal. App.2d 620, 37 P.2d 191 (1934), holding the
indictment sufficient.
71. Commonwealth v. McLoon, 71 Mass. 91, 66 \m. Dec. 354 (1855).
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any allegation of time should not necessarily be fatal ;- in effect
such an accusation is that the defendant committed the crime some
time before the finding of the accusation and within the period of
the statute of limitations ;73 if the defendant needs the date to pre-
pare his defense he can ask for it;74 and if its omission prejudices
the defendant he may obtain a continuance.-5 That is all that fair
play to the defendant necessitates.
One troublesome date problem arises m murder prosecutions in
those states which rule that for murder, death must occur within a
year and a day of the mortal blow.7 6 Must the accusation set forth
dates to show that death did occur within such tune? It would
seem that absence of death within a year and a day is a matter of
defense, so that the accusation need not set forth the fact that the
victim died within the time.7 7 But some courts have held that the
accusation must do so.7 Fairness, however, surely does not re-
quire it. A defendant will rarely be misled if it is not alleged, but
if in some conceivable situation he is misled by the lack of mfor-
mation, he should be given a jostponement. He should not get a
new trial after a conviction on the merits without a showing that
he was prejudiced.
As to allegations of place, it is generally held that it is enough
to state that the offense took place in a certain county, without
naming the town or the street address.79 The Institute Code sen-
sibly provides that even if the county is not alleged, the accusation
is sufficient ;8o it will be assumed that the allegation of crime refers
to a crime committed within the territorial jurisdiction (generally
the county) of the court if not otherwise expressed.8 ' It has been
72. Compare People v. Wagner, 172 Ill. App. 84 (1912) (conviction re-
versed where information alleged crime committed on April 30, 19..).
73. A.L.I. Code § 158 (1930) so provides.
74. Id. § 155 (1930), provides for bills of particulars.
75. Id. § 184(3) (1930), so provides.
76. Thns archaic rule, created at a time when medical knowledge was
almost nonexistent, is still the rule, at common law or by statute, in a
majority of states. Some even extend the rule to manslaughter.
77 See heading Negativing Defenses p. 527 supra.
78. E.g., State v. Kennedy, 8 Rob. 590 (La. 1845), where the indict-
ment alleged a mortal blow, "and a few hours after [the victim] did die of
the said mortal wound;" the court reversed the conviction.
79. E.g., Bennett v. State, 169 Miss. 864, 154 So. 276 (1934) (indictment
alleged driving while intoxicated on a named highway in a particular county),
State v. Ramsauer, 140 Mo. App. 401, 124 S.W 67 (1910) (indictment alleged
gambling m a building at Jasper County, Missouri).
80. Compare the usual rule, which holds such an accusation to be bad.
Poulsom v. State, 113 Neb. 767, 205 N.W 252 (1925) (demurrer should have
been sustained, conviction reversed).
81. A.L.T Code § 159 (1930). This section together with § 158 (as to
time) also eliminates the necessity of alleging "then and there" (see the
Freeman indictment, note I supra, every time a new fact is alleged.
1957]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
held that if an accusation is more specific as to place than it has to
be, as by naming a town, the proof need not be confined to that
town but may extend to any town within the county,82 although it
would seem that if the defendant is actually misled by the variance
he ought to get a postponement.8 3 With crimes like criminal homi-
cide which consist of (1) conduct and (2) results of conduct (as
with murder, requiring a mortal blow with resulting death), must
the place where the result occurs be alleged as well as the place of
the conduct even though it is the place of the conduct which deter-
mines the situs of the crime? Some cases have held that it is neces-
sary to allege the place where the result occurs,8 4 but it would
seem that fairness does not require it,s 5 and a conviction should
not be reversed in the absence of a showing that the defendant was
prejudiced by not knowing the fact.
Indirect Allegattons
Courts have often stated that whatever must be alleged (usually
meaning the elements of the crime, as we have seen) must be
alleged directly and positively, not indirectly and by implication.
Some absurd results have been achieved in the name of this rule.80
It has even been seriously argued that a murder accusation charg-
ing that defendant murdered Viola Hughes is insufficient because
it does not directly state that Viola was a human being.8 7 Fairness
requires that the accusation inform the accused so he can make his
defense, and if the meaning of the accusation is plain enough, it
can make no difference whether the defendant receives this mfor-
mation in a direct or indirect manner.88
82. Commonwealth v. Tolliver, 8 Gray 386 (Mass. 1857) (charge of
assault in Boston, proof of assault in Chelsea, both are in Suffolk County)
83. A.L.I. Code § 184(3) so provides.
84. Brockway v. State, 192 Ind. 656, 138 N.E. 88, 26 A.L.R. 1338
(1923) ("One of the most important things for the defendant to know, in order
to prepare his defense, is the place of death" in murder prosecution).
85. State v. Borders, 199 S.W 180 (Mo. 1917).
86. See Perkins, Short Indictments and Informations, 15 A.B.A.J. 292
n. 24 (1929), citing Fleming v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 653, 139 S.W 598
(1911) (indictment, charging that defendant banker received a deposit "after
the bank was insolvent", held bad because it did not directly state that the
bank was insolvent at the time defendant received the deposit) , Prichard v.
People, 149 Ill. 50, 36 N.E. 103 (1894) (bigamy indictment, charging that
defendant "well knew his first wife was then alive" when he married again,
held bad because it did not directly state the wife was alive at the time he
remarried). In both cases, convictions obtained after trials on the merits, at
which the defendant could not possibly have been misled, were reversed.
87 People v. Gilbert, 199 N.Y. 10, 92 N.E. 85 (1910), rejected the
argument, on the ground that a charge of "murder" implies that the victim
is a human being.
88. See A.L.I. Code § 177 (1930), adopting this view.
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Alternative Allegations
Criminal statutes not infrequently provide that a crime may be
committed by the doing of one of several alternative acts, 9 or by
one of several alternative means,"0 or with one of several alternative
intents,9' or with one of several alternative results. 2 Where the
statute provides such alternatives, may the accusation accuse the
defendant in the same alternatives? May it, for instance, allege that
A broke and entered a "dwelling-house or shop" belonging to B?
Many cases have held such accusations bad, as not properly m-
forming the defendant of the charges or as improperly alleging
tvo different offenses in one count.9' But more recent cases have
allowed such disjunctive pleading, 95 sometimes stating that the
alternatives may be rejected as surplusage.96 It would seem that
fairness to the accused is not violated by a rule permitting allega-
tions in the alternative of different acts, means, intents or results
involved in the defimtion of a single crime.97 Of course to allege
89. E.g., a burglary statute beginning- "Every person who shall
forcibly break and enter, or without force, enter "Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 40-3-6 (1953).
90. E.g.," any dwelling house, whether then occupied or not, kitchen,
office, shop, storehouse, warehouse hotel, saloon, restaurant factory,
water craft, railroad car, church or schoolhouse." Ibid.
91. E.g., "with intent to commit murder, robbery, rape, mayhem, lar-
ceny, or other felony or misdemeanor. " Ibid.
92. E.g., an aggravated robbery statute with increased punishment for
a robber who "wounds or strikes the person robbed or any other person with
a dangerous weapon." Id. § 40-5-1.
93. E.g., Horton v. State, 60 Ala. 72 (1877) (arson of a "barn or stable"
belonging to B), Henderson v. State, 113 Ga. 1148, 39 S.E. 446 (1901)
(defendant struck victim "with a knife, or some other like instrument"),
Shreveport v. Bryson, 212 La. 534, 33 So2d 60 (1947) (reckless driving by
driving under the influence of "intoxicating liquor or drugs"). If the words
used in the statute are synonymous, however, they may be alleged in the
disjunctive. E.g., Cobb v. State, 45 Ga. 11 (1872) (allegation that defendant
permitted minor "to play or roll billiards" held good, playing billiards and
rolling billiards meaning the same thing).
94. See heading Duplicity p. 531 tifra.
95. E.g., People v. Holmes, 129 Colo. 180, 268 P.2d 406 (1954) (involv-
ing the statute note 89 supra and an accusation charging that defendant did
forcibly break and enter and without force did enter a dwelling house),
Commonwealth v. Schuler, 157 Pa. Super. 442, 43 A.2d 646 (1945) (dnving
under the influence of "intomcating liquor or a narcotic or habit-forming
drug").
96. Thus in Wright v. People, 116 Colo. 306, 181 P2d 447 (1947), one
count in a forgery accusation alleged that the defendant "did falsely make.
alter, counterfeit, and forge' a certain istrument, another count that he did
unlawfully "utter, publish and pass" the instrument as genuine. The accusa-
tion was held good, these being simply different ways of committing the
crime of forgery. "There can be no prejudice resulting to the defendant by
reciting in the information several ways the crime may be committed. If
defendant violated the statute in only one way, the fact that other ways were
alleged is mere surplusage " Id. at 310, 181 P2d at 450.
97 A.L.I. Code § 176 (1930) so provides.
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separate crimes in the alternative, e.g., that A committed murder of
B or robbery of C, rather than alternative ways of committing one
crime, would doubtless be bad. Fairness does require something in
the way of allegations of a specific crime.
Duplicity
It is not good pleading for an accusation to be duplicitous, I.X.,
to allege two distinct crimes in one count-as, for instance, that A
kidnapped B and robbed B-although if the two crimes arose out
of a single transaction they could be alleged in two counts of a
single accusation.98 The reason generally given for the rule against
duplicity is that it may "subject the accused to confusion and em-
barrassment in his defense."99 Sometimes it is difficult to say
whether the defendant has committed one crime or two, as where A
throws a bomb into the street, killing B and C, or where A, holding
a gun on both B and C, robs them both together.10 Even if two
separate crimes should be alleged in a single count, the defendant
may be held to have waived the defect if he does not raise the point
before trial.' Fairness does not entitle him to an arrest of judg-
ment or a new trial on appeal after conviction at a trial on the
merits, unless he can show how he was misled by the duplicity 102
Clerical Errors, Mistakes in Names
Clerical errors, misspellings, bad grammar and the like crop up
in the wording of criminal accusations as they do in other forms of
writing. What if the accusation for aggravated battery alleges that
the defendant did "shoow" the victim with a pistol with intent to
98. See heading Joinder of Offenses p. 541 infra.
99. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 119 Mass. 195, 198 (1875), Sprouse v.
Commonwealth, 81 Va. 374 (1886) ("tends to confusion").
100. E.g., People v. Alibez, 49 Cal. 452 (1875) (allegations in one count
that A murdered B, C and D by poison held bad for duplicity; conviction
reversed because demurrer and motion in arrest of judgment should have
been granted), In re Allison, 13 Colo. 525, 22 Pac. 820, 10 L.R.A. 790(1889) (robbery by A of B, C and D at same time and place constitutes three
separate crimes for purposes of double jeopardy) , Kenney v. State, 5 R.I.
385 (1858) (allegations that A assaulted B and C together held valid)
Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 374 (1886) (allegations that defendant com-
mitted forgery by forging a check and then an indorsement thereon held not
duplicitous).
101. Warren v. People, 121 Colo. 118, 213 P.2d 381 (1949), Connon-
wealth v. Holmes, 119 Mass. 195 (1875) (motion to quash or motion to have
prosecution elect one offense is appropriate remedy for duplicity)
102. A.L.I. Code § 185 (1930) provides that no accusation shall be bal
because duplicity exists therein, the court may order the prosecution to sever
the two crimes alleged into separate counts or separate accusations, but if
the defendant can show he was actually prejudiced because of duplicity he
may have a new trial after conviction.
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kill?103 Or suppose the accusation states that the grand jury ac-
cuses A of the rape of B in that B raped B.101 Or suppose the word
"did" is omitted, so that a burglary charge states that A "break and
enter" the dwelling house of BiO5 Many such errors have resulted
in reversed convictions. Misspelled names of the defendant or of
the victim have also caused many a, well deserved conviction to be
reversed, as where the defendant was charged with raping Seanda
Acosta, and at the trial it turned out the lady's name was Senaida
Acosta.'00
Of course, if the defendant wants the clerical or grammatical
error or misspelling corrected on the accusation, he should be able
to ask for it and have it done. But fairness does not require a new
trial after a conviction on the merits unless he can show affirmatively
that he was prejudiced by the mistake. It is hardly conceivable that
an accusation, charging that the defendant did "shoow" the victim
with a pistol with intent to kill, can have failed to inform him that
he did "shoot" the victim. Surely no new trial should be given him
as long as he understood that he was charged with a shooting. And
so, too, of misspelling the name of the victm 0 7 or of the de-
fendant.
°08
Reference to Statutes
It has long been common to conclude the accusation, after
charging the defendant with a particular crime, "against the form
of the statute in such case made and provided." A modem notion
is that it would be much more helpful to the defendant m prepar-
103. State v. Atkins, 142 La. 862, 77 So. 771 (1918), held the defendant,
convicted of the battery for shooting the victim with a pistol, should be dis-
charged, although he had made no demurrer or motion to quash before trial.
104. State v. Stephens, 199 Mo. 261, 97 S.W 860 (1906), held that A,
convicted of rape of B, was entitled to have his conviction reversed.
105. McCearley v. State, 97 Miss. 556, 52 So. 796 (1910), gave A a
new trial after conviction. Compare State v. Edwards, 19 Mo. 674 (1854)
(allegation that A with force and violence "assault" B held good, the onus-
sion of "did" being purely clerical).
106. Pedrosa v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 155, 232 S.WV2d 733 (1950). If
the names have the same sound, however, there will be no new trial for the
variance in spelling. Garlington v. State, 141 Tex. Cnm. 595, 150 S.W.2d
253 (1941) ("Foely" and "Folley").
107 People v. Caponetto, 359 Ill. 41, 194 N.E. 231 (1934).
108. United States v. Denny, 165 F2d 668 (7th Cir. 1947) (defendant's
name spelled Kenny m the second of three counts; the trial court amended
the indictment to read 'Denny", conviction affirmed on 'appeal). Though it is
conceivable defendant might m some circumstances be misled by misspelling
the name of the victim, it is impossible to mislead him by misspelling his
own name.
A.L.I. Code § 184 (1930) provides that usspellings and miswritings or
bad grammar, etc., do not make the accusation insufficient. It may be amended,
and the defendant if actually misled thereby may have a postponement of his
traL
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ing his defense if the precise statute were referred to. The Institute
Code provides that the accusation "may" refer to the statute creat-
ing the offense charged. 09 The federal rules go further and provide
that the accusation "shall" state the statute, but that its omission
or error in the citation shall not be a ground for dismissing the
accusation or reversing a conviction if the defendant is not actually
prejudiced. 10 It has been recently held in a state where the statute
need not be cited at all that to cite the wrong statute will result in
a reversal of the conviction (apparently without the slightest regard
to whether the defendant was prejudiced)."' Fairness, however,
requires no reversal without a showing that the defendant was
actually misled.
Vagueness
Just as, in the substantive criminal law, a criminal statute may
be unconstitutionally "void for vagueness" 1' 2 because it fails to in-
form prospective defendants as to what conduct is criminal, so also
a vague accusation may be unconstitutional in failing to inform the
defendant of the charge. Thus, a perjury indictment alleging that
the defendant lied when he testified on oath that he was not a
"communist sympathizer" was held to be void for vagueness."'
So, too, a scattergun indictment charging conspiracy "to violate title
2 of the National Prohibition Act" was held bad, where title 2
contained 39 sections setting forth as many different ways of vio-
lating the act." 4 Surely fairness to the accused requires a certain
amount of definiteness as to the crime charged.
On principle, however, the prosecution should be allowed to
amend the accusation to inform the defendant more specifically of
the crime,"' or to file a bill of particulars setting forth the details
of the offense which defendant may need to defend himself so long
as the defendant is given time thereafter to prepare his defense.
109. Id. § 154(2) (1930).
110. Fed. R. Crim. P 7(c).
111. Casadas v. People, 304 P.2d 626 (Colo. 1956), where the informa-
tion alleged conspiracy to violate the fictitious check statute Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 40-6-7 (1953), whereas the proper statute is § 40-e-8.
112. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921) (vague
federal statute unconstitutional, for failure to inform defendant of the accusa-
tion) , Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (vague state statute vio-
lates fourteenth amendment due process). See note, Due Process Requirr-
mnents of Definiteness si Statutes, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 77 (1948).
113. United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See
also O'Connor v. United States, 240 F.2 404 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ("member of
the Communist conspiracy").
114. United States v. Dowling, 278 Fed. 630 (S.D. Fla. 1922).
115. Not, however, in the case of indictment, to charge him with a new
crime which the grand jury did not have in mind. See infra note 127
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VARIANCE BETWvEEN ACCUSATION AND PROOF
In many of the situations considered above the deficiencies or
mistakes in the contents of the accusation have become apparent
during the trial, when the proof showed a variance between what
was alleged and what was proved. Thus, as to tne and place we
considered an accusation of crime committed on June 8 where the
proof showed it was committed April 15,116 and an accusation of
crime committed in Boston where the proof showed it was com-
mitted in Chelsea in the same county.11 7 The cases on clerical errors
and misspellings really involve variances, as where defendant is
charged with "shoowing" the victim and the proof shows he "shot"
the victim,118 or defendant is accused of raping "Seanda" and the
proof is that he raped "Senada."11 9 We have seen that the more
detail an accusation contains, the greater chance of a variance be-
tween allegations and proof. 20 Different jurisdictions require alle-
gations of more or less detail, as we have seen.'-" What happens if
a certain detail is alleged which need not have been alleged, and
then the proof at the trial discloses a variance between the super-
fluous detail and the proof thereof? If might, of course, be argued
that variances as to details which need not have been alleged at all
are not as bad as variances as to details which must be alleged.
A defendant charged with stealing a flannel sheet secured a
reversal because the proof showed the sheet was made of cotton
and wool.1 '2 A defendant, charged with aiding and abetting the
principal by pushing, striking, and threatening the victim (the de-
tails of how he aided not being required to be alleged), cannot prop-
erly be convicted on proof that he aided in some other way.23 A
defendant might properly be siply charged with stealing "one
mule", but if he is actually charged with stealing "one bay mare
mule" the proof must conform as to the sex and color of the animal.124
The cases point out that the reason for reversing convictions
because of variances as to details (whether the details be those re-
quired to be alleged or superfluous details) is that the defendant
may be misled in preparing his defense.12 5 The trouble is that the
116. See note 70 supra.
117. See note 82 supra.
118. See note 103 supra.
119. See note 106 supra.
120. See note 37 supra and text.
121. See heading Details p. 529 supra.
122. Alkenbrack v. People, 1 Denio 80 (N.Y. 1845).
123. Fulford v. State, 50 Ga. 591 (1874).
124. See Turner v. State, 3 Heisk. 452, 456 (Tenn. 1872).
125. See cases cited notes 122-24 supra; Guilbeau v. United States, 288
Fed. 731 (5th Cir. 1923), where the court said m reversing a conviction on an in-
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mere possibility of misleading the defendant should not be the
ground for reversing a conviction. There should be a showing that
the defendant was actually misled, rather than a speculation that
he might possibly have been misled. That is all which fairness to
the accused requires.""-
AMENDMENT TO THE ACCUSATION
Where defects of various sorts in the contents of the accusation
come to light before or during trial-whether it be the omission of
something that ought to be alleged, the inclusion of something un-
necessary to be alleged, inaccuracies which will lead to a variance,
or misspellings or clerical errors-the sensible thing which the
prosecution will usually want to do when the defect becomes known
is to move the court to be allowed to amend the accusation and then
get on with the business at hand, namely the prosecution (postpon-
ing the trial if the accused has been misled in preparing his de-
fense) Can the situation be saved from dismissal of the accusation
or reversal of a well-founded conviction by the simple remedy of
allowing an amendment? If the accusation is in the form of an in-
formation, there is usually not much difficulty as to amendment.
The prosecuting attorney prepared the accusation in the first place,
so he may be allowed to amend it now But with an indictment the
argument may be made that the grand jury originated it, and only
the grand jury can amend it. Of course, as a practical matter, the
prosecuting attorney actually drafted it, and the grand jury relied
on him for the technicalities in wording it, but still it is theoretically
the wording of the grand jury
No doubt an amendment to an indictment which will change the
charge from crime A to another crime B cannot be allowed. 13
As to indictment defects of a less serious nature, one view is that
dictment for selling derivatives of opium, to wit, four grains of morphine
sulphate, when the evidence showed the sale of four grains of morphine hydro-
chloride. "If the rule against a material variance be considered technical, yet
it is sound, and only by adhering to it can the danger of misleading a
defendant be avoided." Id. at 732.
126. A.L.I. Code § 184(2) (1930) provides that no variance shall be a
ground to acquit the defendant, but that if the defendant is actually prejudiced
he should be given a postponement of the trial, before the same or another
jury; no variance shall result in arrest of judgment or reversal on appeal
unless it is affirmatively shown the defendant was in fact prejudiced in his
defense on the merits.
127 E.g., State v. Goodrich, 46 N.H. 186 (1865) (amendment changing
indictment from petit larceny to grand larceny not allowed). See People v.
Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890, 69 A.L.R. 1378 (1930) (indictment
may not be amended to permit trial upon a crime not charged by the grand
jury). See heading Connction of Crime Charged on Proof of Crme Charged
p. 519 supra.
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no such amendment can be made, only the grand jury can ever
make the amendment. -s The better view is that mistakes of form
can be corrected.' 2 9 Notions of fairness are not violated by the
sensible view that an accusation may be amended as to formal mat-
ters before trial or during trial, so as to prevent a variance, as long
as the defendant is given time to prepare his defense as to any-
thing which has really misled him.
JOINDER OF OFFENSES AND DEFENDANTS
Joinder of Offenses
A criminal accusation frequently contains separate counts, each
being a complete accusation of a crime committed by the defencant.
It may be that the accusation recognizes that the defendant com-
mitted only one crime, but the various counts cover different
theories of what crime he committed or how he committed it.Y2° It
may be that by one act he committed several crimes,13' each of
which crimes may in most jurisdictions be alleged in a separate
count of a single accusation. Or it may be that he engaged in a
course of continuous conduct by which he committed several crimes
one after another.132 There is more of a question as to whether
128. Ex parte Barn, 121 U.S. 1 (1887), Patrick v. People, 132 Ill. 529,
24 N.E. 619 (1890), State v. McCarthy, 17 R.I. 370, 22 Ad. 282 (1891).
129. United States v. Denny, 165 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1947) (allowing cor-
rection of spelling of defendant's name), Hawthorn v. State, 56 lid. 530(1881) (striking out surplusage). A.L.I. Code § 184(1) (1930) allows amend-
ments of indictments or informations as to any defect or omission of form,
including misspellings, miswriting, bad English, abbreviations, etc. rd. § 186
allows amendments after verdict so as to make the accusation self-sufficient
for later protection of the defendant against double jeopardy.
130. Thus it may be that the defendant's one crime was on the border-
line between false pretenses and larceny by trick, so the accusation contains a
count for each in order to meet the proof. Where the defendant inflicted two
wounds on the victim, either one of which rmght be found to be the fatal
wound, there may be a count for each. See the indictment at note 1 .spra.
And where defendant stabbed the victim and then choked him, it being some-
what uncertain which act caused the death, there may be a count for each
theory. A sensible rule is provided for in Fed. R. Crim. P 7 (c) "It may be
alleged in a single count that [defendant] committed [the offense]
by one or more specified means."
131. Thus if A throws a bomb into the street, killing B and C in the
explosion, one view is that A has committed two separate crimes. See note
100 .supra. Perhaps it is easier to view crimes as separate where one follows
the other by a moment of time, as where A rapidly pulls the trigger twice,
first killing B and then C.
132. State v. Thompson, 139 Kan. 59, 29 P.2d 1101 (1934) (defendants
surprised a young couple out for a drive, raping the girl and robbing the boy
of Is clothing and car). The court in that case gave this hypothetical ex-
ample: A breaks into and enters B's house with intent to steal, steals B's
property, rapes Mrs. B, kills C who discovers him, and burns down the house
to hide his crimes. The court stated that in the hypothetical situation it
would be proper to join burglary, larceny, rape, murder and arson in several
counts of one accusation. Id. at 62, 29 P2d at 1102.
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similar but unconnected crimes may be joined in a single accusa-
tion."' It is clear everywhere, however, that unconnected crimes of
a dissimilar nature cannot be joined134-- as where A robs B one day
and rapes C the next-it being unfair to impose on the defendant
the burden of defending himself simultaneously against different
unrelated charges. Doubtless also it is unfair thus to present the
defendant to the jury in the role of an habitual violator by joining
unrelated crimes.13
5
Where there is a misjoinder of dissimilar and unrelated crimes,
the defendant is not necessarily entitled to have the accusation dis-
missed before trial, much less automatically to have his conviction
reversed after trial. A proper remedy is to make the prosecution
elect between the various offenses and then proceed with the trial.11'
Even if the motion to elect is improperly denied and the defendant
is made to defend against all charges, probably fairness requires that
he be entitled to a new trial only if it is affirmatively shown that he
was actually embarrassed in his defense,137 a not unlikely situation
in case of misjoinder, but not necessarily the case.
A common law rule still persisting to some extent today'3 8 is
that, though otherwise joinable, a felony and misdemeanor cannot
be joined (unless perhaps the misdemeanor is a lesser included
offense within the felony) "" The reason is that in England at the
time the rule developed, defendants in misdemeanor prosecutions
133. As where A rapes B one day and rapes C a week later in the same
county. Fed. R. Crim. P 8(a) allows joinder of counts for offenses "of the
same or similar character. "
134. McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76 (1896) (forbidding joinder
of charges that defendants on April 16 assaulted A with intent to kill, and on
May 1 committed arson of B's dwelling; some of the defendants involved in
the assault charge were different from the defendants in the arson charge)
135. Id. at 80- "objectionable as tending to confound the accused in his
defense, or to prejudice him in the matter of being held out to be habitual-
ly criminal, in the distraction of the attention of the jury, or otherwise."
136. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894) (A charged with
murder of B with an axe in one count, murder of C with an axe on same
date and in same county in another count). The case pointed out that where
the date, place and county were the same, but the indictment itself did not
otherwise disclose a connection between the two crimes, the court niilit
properly refuse a motion to dismiss the indictment or to make the prosecution
elect before trial, waiting to see whether the evidence at the trial woul de
velop a connection between the two crimes. Here at the trial it appeared that
A slew B and C together, one right after the other, with the same axe.
In the absence of a motion by the defendant to quash or to elect, the
defendant cannot after conviction raise the question of misjoinder of counts.
See Trask v. People, 35 Colo. 83, 88, 83 Pac. 1010. 1012 (1905).
137 So provided in A.L.I. Code § 185(4) (1930) There is no provi-
sion in the Code setting forth when joinder of offenses is proper or improper.
138. See e.g., Hunter v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. St. 503, 506 (1875)
Eckhardt v. People, 126 Colo. 18, 247 P.2d 673 (1952) (improper to join
assault and battery with voluntary manslaughter).
139. See Eckhardt v. People, note 138 supra (proper to join murder with
involuntary manslaughter)
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were entitled to certain advantages-such as the right to counsel,
and to have a copy of the accusation-which were not available to
felony defendants. Since the. reason for the rule has long since dis-
appeared-felony defendants today have at least as many rights
as misdemeanor defendants-the rule itself has been abolished in
many jurisdictions.140 Fairness does not, of course, require the
retention of a rule when the reason for its existence has long since
disappeared.
Habitual criminal statutes commonly provide for increased pun-
ishment for the present offense in case of a certain number of prior
convictions. If the defendant is being charged as an habitual crimi-
nal, he is of course entitled to be informed of that fact."' On the
other hand, fairness requires that, although he be informed of it,
the jury be kept uninformed of it until after they return a verdict
as to the present crime, lest the jury be influenced by his past bad
record in determining his present guilt.
Joznder of Defendants
Where two or more defendants jointly participate in a crime
they may be prosecuted together by the joinder of defendants in
one accusation, such as an indictment accusing A and B of robbery
of C.1 42 In the absence of joint participation they cannot be joined."4 3
The appropriate remedy in the case of misjoinder of defendants is
for a defendant to move to sever in order to have a separate trial.',,
140. See Hunter v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. St 503, 505 (1875), State v.
Fitzsmon, 18 R.I. 236, 237, 27 Aft. 446, 447 (1893), annot, 9 L.R.A. 182
(1890). Fed. R. Crn. P 8(a) allows joinder of misdemeanors and felonies.
141. State v. Reiley, 94 Conn. 698, 110 At. 550 (1920), annot., 58
A.L.R. 20, 64 (1929). Cf. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954), where
the procedure of informing defendant orally at his arraignment for the
principal crime that he will be tried as an habitual criminal mas held to
violate fourteenth amendment due process, at least if the defendant were not
granted a continuance to secure counsel to fight the habitual criminal charge.
142. Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 262 (1947).
Fed. R Crim P 8(b) authorizes joinder of jointly participating defendants.
For one answer to the question of what happens when the combined conduct
of two defendants causes a crime, but there is no "concert of action" between
them, see State v. Blackley, 191 Wash. 23, 70 P2d 799 (1937) (one defendant
A recklessly parked his bus m a dangerous spot; the other defendant B
recklessly drove into the bus, bounced off and killed an oncoming motorist C,
held, A and B could properly be joined).
143. Orfield, -op. cit. supra note 142, at 263, United States v. Interstate
Properties, Inc., 153 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (defendants jointly charged
with manslaughter for omission to act, where each had a different duty to
act), see State v. Herrera, 28 N.M. 155, 207 Pac. 1085, 24 A.LR. 1134(1922) (A, B and C were witnesses at D's trial and testified falsely one after
the other; misjoinder of A, B and C, but defendant failed to raise the point
until the appeal).
144. A severance may -properly be granted, even where the defendantsjointly participated in a crime, if there is some evidence admissible against A
but not against B if B is tried alone; in such case B may be prejudiced by ajoint trial with A.
19571
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
If no such motion is made, a joint defendant can hardly complain
of misjoinder after conviction at a trial on the merits.1 41 Even if
such a motion is made but improperly denied, a convicted defendant
is not automatically entitled to a new trial without a showing that
he was prejudiced by the misjoinder 14 0 if essential fairness is to be
the guide.
Copy oF ACCUSATION FURNISHED TO AccusD
A number of state constitutions provide that the accused in a
criminal case has the right to demand a copy of the accusation.
These and many other states provide that he is entitled to a copy
either at his request or as a matter of right without a request.14" It
seems clear that fairness requires that the defendant be allowed to
read and study the accusation for a period of time before the ar-
raignment long enough to decide how to plead.
NAMES OF WITNESSES
A number of states provide that the names of witnesses who
testified before the grand jury must be indorsed on the indictment
while a.number of others provide that the prosecuting attorney shall
endorse on the accusation the names of the witnesses he plans to call
at the trial. 148 Some states provide that failure to endorse shall be
a ground for a motion to quash. Others provide that such failure
cannot be made on the basis of such a motion, at least if the prose-
cution promptly comes forward with the names.149 The requirement
of endorsing the names of witnesses is, of course, for the benefit
of the defendant, by informing him in a general way of the testimony
he will have to meet at the trial. Though the minimum standards
imposed by due process probably do not require such endorsement,
the rule seems eminently fair,"50 although failure to endorse a wit-
145. State v. Herrera, 28 N.M. 155, 207 Pac. 1085, 24 A.L.R. 1134(1922).
146. A.L.I. Code § 185(4) (1930) so provides.
147 Id. § 193 and commentaries thereon. The Code provides for fur-
nishing defendant with a copy 24 hours before being called on to plead, but
if he is not so furnished and yet does plead, the subsequent proceedings are
not invalidated.
148. Id. § 194 and commentaries thereon.
149. Ibid.
150. A.L.I. Code § 194 (1930) provides for indorsing the names of
witnesses on whose evidence the accusation is based, plus such other wit-
nesses as the prosecution plans to call. Names may be added later. No con-
tinuance will be granted because of new names unless the interests of justice
require it.
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ness' name should entitle defendant to no more than a continuance
if the new witness' appearance in the case necessitates that the de-
fendant have mord time to prepare his defense.
DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION
A defendant who wishes information before trial for the purposes
of preparing his defense may be able to obtain some information
from the prosecution besides what is set forth in the accusation, or
in a billof particulars spelling out some of the details of the accusa-
tion. He may have a right to inspect and copy items (usually docu-
ments) obtained by the prosecution from the defendant or from
others by seizure or by process if such information be necessary for
his defense.15' He may also subpoena evidentiary matter, in the
possession of the prosecution, for use at the tral.5 2 These matters
are analogous to accusation problems in the sense that they all have
to do with obtaining information from the prosecution in order to
prepare the defense, but insofar as they are not related to the dc-
cusation they are beyond the scope of this article.
CONCLUSION
We have seen that many an absurd result has followed from
quite unimportant defects in criminal accusations-omissions, super-
fluities, miswordings, misspellings, and variances-the results be-
ing especially unfortunate where the court orders a reversal of the
defendant's conviction secured at a trial upon evidence disclosing
his guilt. 53 But fairness both to the accused and to the state re-
quires that the courts bear in mind the basic function of the accusa-
tion, to give notice to the accused so that he can make his defense.
Some courts have asked themselves whether the defendant could
possibly by some conceivable chance have been misled by the
alleged defect? Others have not even asked this broad question.
The real question which courts should ask is, was the defendant
actually misled? Or perhaps, if the situation is such that it is diffi-
cult for hun to show that he was actually prejudiced, is there a sub-
stantial possibility that he iwas misled? If the answer is no, the de-
fendant is entitled to no relief except perhaps to have the accusa-
151. E.g., Fed. R. Crim. P 16 (discovery and inspection).
152. Id. 17(c), note, 38 J. Crun. L., C. & P.S. 249 (1947).
153. Besides the cases listed in the footnotes to this article, see Perkins,
Absurdities it Crimnal Procedure, 11 Iowa L Rev. 297 (1976), where a
great many such absurdities are brought to light, especially in the area of
the accusation part of criminal procedure.
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tion amended. 154 If the answer is yes, he may be entitled to a new
trial after conviction (by the granting of a motion in arrest of
judgment or by reversing the conviction on appeal), although even
here the appropriate relief may be the granting of extra time to the
defendant to reprepare his defense when the defect comes to light.
There is some question as to whether the rules relating to fair-
ness in the accusation procedure, even when properly administered,
do not give too great an advantage to the accused. Does not fairness
require some reciprocal duty on the defendant to inform the prose-
cution before trial as to his defense, so that the prosecuting attorney
can properly prepare his case? The defendant can put in evidence
a great many possible defenses on a plea of not guilty such as com-
pulsion, self-defense, alibi (in most states), insanity (in most
states), intoxication, mistake of fact or law, the statute of limita-
tions, and entrapment, without giving any information to the prose-
cution before trial as to the theory of his defense.15 He need not
furnish the prosecution with a list of his witnesses, as in most states
the prosecution must do for him. 150 There is much merit in a scheme
of criminal procedure that calls for equality in the sense of advance
notice to the prosecution as well as to the accused.
Advances in criminal procedure, including accusatory procedure,
have been slow. Courts tend to look too much to precedents from a
past age which faced different problems from those existing today
Prosecuting attorneys have, perhaps, not unnaturally, copied old
accusation forms without trying out newer and better ones. Legis-
latures have helped to produce more sensible rules, though their
invitations to change are often so vague as to give little guidance.
On the whole, progress has been slow, but under the impetus of the
federal rules and the Institute Code some recent progress has been
made. The American Bar Association study of the administration
of criminal justice, presently under way, indicates an enheartening
interest of the bar in matters of criminal procedure. The trend of
modern thinking is surely in the direction of fair rules of procedure,
fair to the accused but also fair to the people of the state.
154. If he is not misled, he should not get a retrial after conviction, not
only where he first raises the issue of the defect after conviction, but also
where he raised the issue before trial (by demurrer or motion to quash) or
during trial (perhaps by a motion for directed verdict of acquittal because of
a variance).
155. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Re-
port on Criminal Procedure 34 (1931), recommended that defendant give the
prosecution notice of such defenses before trial. See also Millar, supra note 16,
at 503.
156. See Millar, supra note 16, at 503-05, arguing for a requirement that
defendant furnish such a list.
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